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In some respects, it is extremely unfortunate that names are ever attached
either to ideas or objects. The false
attachment of names to ideas or objects
similar but not identical with the original
can work harm far exceeding the benefits
conferred by having a convenient label.
The name "species" has come to such a
state.
As we shall see, a species, be it plant
or animal, is a fiction, a mental construct
without objective existence. Animal, and
plant, lines of descent exist in a four-dimensional continuum. To set up species
in this continuous line of descent, we must
chop it into units, and in any such process
the divisions are purely arbitrary. Available information makes such a view more
or less self-evident. What, then, is a
"species"? Instead of starting with an
evolutionary line and dealing with it on
the basis of preconceived concepts, working from the top down, so to speak, let
us work from the bottom tip.
Our starting point will be an individual
animal, which for convenience we will say
answers to the name of John. John is a
sexually-reproducing animal. As such,
he comes into existence at the moment that
certain sperm and egg nuclei fuse, at which
moment we may refer to him as Johno,
one cell with a nucleus. The next time
we look for Johno, we can't find him. In
his place, we find a stranger with two cells.
Ah-ha, we say, John has undergone celldivision. We are confident that if we
had observed Johno we would have seen
his continuous transformation into this
two-celled stranger who is obviously not
Johno. Since we are sure he does have
some sort of a very close relation to Johno,
we decide to call this new animal John,.
Similarly we find John1 displaced by
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John2 and he by John3,4, 5, .. .. Thus we
have followed what is usually called the
"growing-up," or the ontogeny of an
individual. But what is John? Obviously, he is not the same thing at any two
successive instants. Now he is John1324;
the next instant he is John1325,
forever and
irrevocably different from any John that
has come before or from any that will
come in the future. Thus Johnl is a succession of conformations of matter in
time, and any meaningful study of him
will have to consider the four-dimensional
JohnO+1+2+3+4+

* * * z

One fine spring day the tender passion stirs John,,'s breast, and he looks
around for a mate. Withinl his immediate horizon he espies Janen+i, Joann+2
and June?+3. For reasons too devious to
explore at this time, Johnn+4 chooses
Jane,+5 for his mate, or perhaps, viceversa. Thus we pass from the individual
to the breeding population, our next
meaningful unit.
What precisely is a breeding population? From John's point of view, it includes all females with whom he might
ordinarily mate; in other words, it takes
in a territory extending from a central
point out to the limits of John's wanderings. Such a territory includes males
who would be equally glad to mate with
the females of this same area. The total
population of males and females ready,
willing, and able to interbreed and centered around a particular anlimalwe may
denote a breeding population. Each individual in this population will also be
the center of another breeding population, most of which will have territories
extending beyond the original one. The
character of a given breeding population
is never identical at any two moments.
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The individuals in it are constantly clhanging in character. New animals are constantly added by birth and immigration
and others are lost by death and emiigration. Furthermliore, as the central
animal travels, his breeding population
shifts also in geographic position, adding
and subtracting animals from the poptulation in so doing.
Since we have defined the breeding population as comprising those females with
which John will mate (or would if he
had time and opportunity) and the males
which can mate with them, it follows that
the breeding population is characterized
by a genetical continuity and similarity,
fluid and shifting, but unmistakable.
Naturally, the elemnentsof this population will not be genetically idlentical,even
apart from sex differences. No natural
population is. But the germ plasms of
John,, and Jane,, and/or Joann and/or
June, are similar and compatible at least
to the extent that they produce viable and
fertile offspring, thus insuring the continuity of the population. Thus we have a
moderately definable, natural, biological
unit composed of animals which in nature
will interbreed as the opportunity presents.
From John to Jane to breeding population we have a certain biological continuum, the individuals of the breeding
population being connected, figuratively,
by strands of germ plasm which represent
this continuity. When we try to deal with
larger aggregates of individuals, our categories become more and more abstract and
empty of any real meaning. Our basic
taxoniomic unit is, of course, the subspecies. The best description available of a
subspecies seems to be that it is a geographically (or ecologically) isolated subdivision of a species. This says little
enough. From our point of view, a subspecies would be a geographically confined aggregate of breeding populations.
What, then, is a species? It would
seem thus far to be the whole of any one
series of breeding populations. This is
certainly an innocuous-seeming defini-

tion, but is it ? The definition-as it stands
unfortunately puts all living and fossil animals in one species, since there is a continuity of germ-plasnmback from John to
the original primordial cell, and from it
forward to every living animal (not to
mention plant). Thus, if we ignore time,
we end up with only one species, which
is all to the good insofar as it emphasizes
the unity of life and the Brotherhood of
Man, but is of little use to the practicing
taxonomist.

Can we avoid the temporal difficulty?
Let us redefine the species as the whole
of any one series of breeding populations
as it exists at any one time.

This defini-

tioln mlerely lands us in an exactly opposite difficulty, for we now have an infinity of species, time being infinitely divisible. Both these definitions of species at
least have the advantage of being as objective as possible, but if we try to keep
the definition of a species objective and
still useful, we are forced to bring into the
definition a discrete unit of time. As soon
as we do this, we are, of course, being
arbitrary, and perhaps not a little ridiculous. If we shouild define a species as the
whole of any one series of breeding populations in existence over a period of 10,000 years, who is to say as to when the
year zero is to be? Further, insofar as
paleontology is concerned, no absolute
time scale of usable "fineness" and precision is obtainable, and no cognizance is
taken of differing evolutionary rates.
Thus, we come back to our original
contention, that "species" have only a
subjective existence. Our real biological
unit is the breeding population, since it
is through this ever-changing unit that
the germ-plasm is passed. Taxonomy
takes no notice of the breeding population, but any permanently useful taxonomuicsystemnmust take account of its
existence and its significance. Species and
subspecies are the units with which the
taxonomiist deals, but they are merely
convenient labels for arbitrary groupings
and have only a minimum of biological
meaning.
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The question whether or not species
have objective reality is a perennial one.
If a species were merely "a fiction, a
mental construct without objective existence" one would expect under all circumstances the borderline between species
to be exceedingly vague and subjective.
However, if Dr. Burma should make an
excursion into the neighborhood of his
home town, he will find that every species
of birds and mammals is sharply separated
from every other one. This is not an exceptional situation; in fact it is the conditionl naturalists find in every part of the
world. The primitive Papuani of the
mountains of New Guinea recognizes as
species exactly the same natural units
that are called species by the museum
ornithologist (Mayr, 1946). The arrangement of organic life into well-defined units is universal, and it is this
striking discontinuity between local populations which impressed the naturalists
Ray and Linnaeus and led to the development of the species concept. There can
be no argument as to the objective reality
of the gaps between local species in sexually reproducing organisms.
An excursion into the field of semantics
appears helpful at this point. There are
concepts that are absolute, like stone or
fire, and others that are relative. If I
meet an unknown man I do not know
whether or not he is a brother. He is a
brother only in relation to another person (a brother or sister of his). The
word species likewise is such a relational
term. It separates interbreeding populations from all others. In fact, the word
species is most meaningful in connection
with populations that are not conspecific,
populations that are separated by a reproductive gap.
It has been pointed out (Burma, above)
that it is virtually impossible to delimit a

breeding population. Though manly individuals are obviously members of a
single effective, local breeding population,
there are other individuals, more distant
in space and time, wxhichmight possibly
belong to different populations of the
same species. It is n-otpossible to undertake a clearcut delimlitationof one breeding population of a species against others.
This is no major tragedy at this point
since we are not discussing the delimitation of breeding populations. What is
important is the fact that there is no
difficulty in delimiting a breeding poptulation of one species against a sympatricsynchronous breeding population of other
species. The gap between such species is
well defined and has objective reality.
The presence or absence of a reproductive gap can be tested only where populations are in contact. The species thus
has full objective reality only in a local
fauna or flora. This non-dimensional
species (Mayr, l.c.) is the standard of the
species concept as originally conceived by
Ray and Linnaeus. The objective reality
of this species is beyond doubt.
To repeat once more, the essence of
the species concept is the non-interbreeding of a population with other populations,
a phenomenon which can be tested only
where such populations are in contact.
No matter how different certain individuals might be (polymorphs, larval stages,
etc.), as soon as it is established that they
are members of a single breeding population, they are considered conspecific.
The difficulties which Dr. Burma sees
are not those of the original, non-dimensional species concept. Rather they are
due to an expansion of this species concept in space and timie. All species are
subject to evolutionary change since, as
Dobzhansky stated so truly, the species is
merely a stage in an evolutionary process.
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It is implicit in the theory of evolution
that species should change in space and in
time. There should be populations in an
evolutionary series which are on the
borderline between- an ancestral and a
daughter species. But even such a borderline population is as good a species in
relation to others with which it is iTt contact as any lnormal species.
The difficulties to the practical application of the species concept caused by
evolutioni are more apparent than real.
There are gaps even in a multidimensional
system. These gaps, as far as paleontologists are concerned, are caused by the extreme scantiness of the fossil record. The
number of well described transformations
of one species into another one is actually very small. Usually there is either
a sequence of sharply discontinuous species as with the Eocene oysters of Texas
(Stenzel, 1949) or else the sequence consists of slight subspecies, with even the extremes not yet having reached full species
level. The fact that species are the product of evolution and continue to evolve
seems only rarely to become a source of
practical difficulties for paleontologists.
In the majority of the cases the working
paleontologist is dealing with a non-dimensional situation (as described above).
In a single horizon at a single locality the
species of the paleontologist are as well
defined as are those of the local naturalist.
Whenever a paleontologist runs into difficulties in such a non-dimensional system,
it is not due to the weakness of the species concept but rather due to difficulties
of taxonomic analysis (polymorphism,
ecophenotypes, age variation, etc.).

The species concept has n-ot only its
greatest objective reality in a non-dimensional system, but also its greatest usefulness. In a sympatric-synlchronoussituation there is niothinginitermediatebetween
breeding populationis and species. If a
paleontologist studies a series of specimens from a given horizon, he knows that
they are all either members of a single species or of different species. By definition
there canl be no intermediate stages in
such a collection as, for example, subspecies. The species concept not only
permits but actually demands an unequivocal decision. The species to be delimited in such cases by the practical
taxonomist is by no means "a mental construct without objective existence," as
claimed by Dr. Burma.
In all multidimensional situations an inference has to be made (Simpson, 1943)
on the basis of the objective species of thenon-dimensional system. The subjectivity of this expanded species concept by no
means invalidates the species concept per
se. The species of the local naturalist or
of the paleontologist within a given horizon is clearly delimited against other species and can thus be considered as having
objective reality.
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At first glance it will seem that Dr.
Mayr and I are indeed far apart in our
conception of species. However, I believe that a close reading will show that
our positions are actually not so very different after all. The neozoologist is usu-
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ally impressed by the distinctness of the
"species" he sees in the world today.
On the other hand, the paleontologist is
more likely to be impressed by the continuity of a given evolutionary line. Dr.
Mayr's criticisms, I believe, do not actu-
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ally attack the fundamental basis of my
argument, the complete subjectivity of
the concept of "species" when viewed in a
four-dimensional space-time rather than
in the unreal three-dimensional space of
static time. They do focus attention on
the practical utility of species as tused by
the neozoologist.
I cannot, however, agree that paleontologists are so uniformly impressed
by the objective reality of species. It is
true that in the past paleontologists seemed
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to have been little troubled by this. On
the other hand, it is well to remember
that many of the paleontologic species of
fifty years ago are the genera and subgenera of today. The paleontologist of
today finds it more and more difficult to
recognize valid differences between the
"species" of a given phyletic line as collecting and study become more thorough.
It is this practical and growing difficulty
which prompted my foregoing analysis of
the species concept.

